fiduciary duty

Weak Standards Make Annuities Prohibited Transactions in ERISA Plans

/ ChrisTobe / 2 Comments

Introduction

ERISA was enacted to impose strict fiduciary, accounting, and investment performance standards on retirement plan assets. SEC-registered mutual funds must meet these standards through transparent reporting, daily pricing, and oversight by independent boards. By contrast, insurance-based annuities operate under weaker fiduciary standards, opaque accounting rules, and undisclosed performance spreads, making them unlikely to qualify for an exemption from ERISA’s prohibited transaction rules.¹

As my earlier analyses demonstrate, annuities have become a gateway drug that opened the door to non-standard accounting and conflicted arrangements in retirement plans.²

I. Fiduciary Standards: ERISA §404(a) vs. NAIC Rule 275

ERISA §404(a) imposes explicit duties of prudence and loyalty, requiring fiduciaries to act solely in the interest of participants and beneficiaries. By contrast, NAIC Rule 275, the state insurance ‘best interest’ standard, does not include a loyalty duty and permits conflicts of interest if disclosures are made.³ Plan fiduciaries cannot rely on NAIC compliance to meet ERISA duties. A product that satisfies Rule 275 may still violate ERISA’s exclusive benefit rule, making it a prohibited transaction.

II. Accounting Standards: Book Value vs. Market Value

Mutual funds must report daily mark-to-market NAVs under SEC rules, fully reflecting gains and losses. Annuities, especially General Account or Separate Account contracts, are governed by statutory accounting. Assets are often held at amortized cost, meaning losses are hidden unless realized. Portfolios frequently contain 30–50% private credit and alternatives.⁴ Book-value accounting disguises true risk, making annuities appear ‘safe’ when underlying portfolios may be volatile or impaired.

III. Investment Performance Standards: Spreads and Opaqueness

Mutual funds disclose expense ratios, portfolio holdings, and benchmark comparisons. Annuities credit 2–3% to participants while earning 6–7% on general account assets. The undisclosed spread—sometimes over 400 basis points—represents pure insurer profit.⁵ This opacity prevents fiduciaries from assessing the reasonableness of compensation, triggering ERISA §406(b) self-dealing prohibitions.

IV. Conflicted Providers and “Party in Interest” Risks

In many 401(k) plans, the recordkeeper is also the annuity provider. As Cunningham v. Cornell highlighted, this dual role creates inherent conflicts of interest. When insurers steer plan assets into affiliated annuities, fiduciaries face direct exposure under the prohibited transaction rules.⁶

V. Transparency Suppression: Prudential and NAIC RBC Proposal

Prudential, domiciled in New Jersey, shields its quarterly solvency filings under N.J. Stat. §17-23-1, denying plan fiduciaries access to critical risk data.⁷ The NAIC Capital Adequacy Task Force has proposed banning public disclosure of insurer Risk-Based Capital (RBC) scores, even though the Society of Actuaries warns that transparency is essential.⁸ Fiduciaries cannot evaluate insurer solvency without this data, a critical factor in selecting annuities.

VI. Litigation Outlook

The Supreme Court has already narrowed available exemptions from prohibited transaction rules.² Combined with weak fiduciary standards, opaque accounting, undisclosed spreads, and active suppression of solvency data, annuities present a litigation time bomb: plaintiffs will argue that fiduciaries cannot prudently select annuities without access to solvency and fee data. Courts will increasingly view annuities as per se prohibited transactions absent full transparency. Most annuities do not have downgrade provisions, so their liquidity risks go up simultaneously with their credit risk. Fabozzi, in the 1998 Handbook of stable value, says that General Account fixed annuities have 10 times the risk of synthetic diversified stable value.

Conclusion

Annuities fail across three pillars: fiduciary duties, accounting standards, and performance transparency. SEC-registered mutual funds meet all three; annuities meet none. By continuing to rely on these weaker standards, insurers are ensuring that their products will be viewed as prohibited transactions under ERISA, and plan fiduciaries who adopt them will face heightened litigation risk.

Footnotes

¹ ERISA §406; see also https://commonsense401kproject.com/2025/06/13/annuities-are-prohibited-transactions-via-chat-gpt/
² https://commonsense401kproject.com/2025/05/10/annuities-flunk-prohibited-transactions-exemption-scotus-ruling-will-open-floodgates-of-litigation/
³ Comparison of ERISA §404(a) with NAIC Rule 275; see also https://commonsense401kproject.com/2025/07/27/diversification-abandoned-why-plan-fiduciaries-must-rethink-fixed-annuities-and-pension-risk-transfers/
⁴ https://commonsense401kproject.com/2025/08/12/4-sets-of-books-how-trumps-401k-push-opens-the-door-to-accounting-chaos/
⁵ Spread profits analysis; see https://commonsense401kproject.com/2025/06/24/state-guarantee-associations-behind-annuities-are-a-joke/
⁶ Cunningham v. Cornell Univ., 86 F.4th 961 (2d Cir. 2023).
⁷ N.J. Stat. §17-23-1.
⁸ NAIC, Capital Adequacy Task Force, Special National Meeting Packet (2025), p.56.

SOURCES

The Handbook of Stable Value Investments 1st Edition by Frank J. Fabozzi 1998 Jacquelin Griffin Evaluating Wrap Provider Credit Risk in Synthetic GICs pg. 272 https://www.amazon.com/Handbook-Stable-Value-Investments/dp/1883249422

National Association of Government Defined Contribution Administrators.  2010.  2010 Issue Brochure – What Plan Sponsors Should Know About Stable Value Funds (SVF) www.nagdca.org/documents/StableValueFunds.pdf

Shames, Mitch.  2022.  “Annuities: The straw that breaks the back of retirement plan fiduciaries,” Benefits Pro.  May 3, 2022.  https://www.benefitspro.com/2022/05/03/annuities-the-straw-that-breaks-the-back-of-retirement-plan-fiduciaries/?slreturn=20240312164319 .  Accessed on March 12, 2024.

Tobe, Christopher B.  2004. “The Consultants Guide to Stable Value.”  Journal of Investment Consulting, 7(1), Summer 2004, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=577603 .  Accessed on March 12, 2024. 

Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Summer 1992 Todd, Wallace SPDA’s and GIC’s http://www.minneapolisfed.org/research/QR/QR1631.pdf

“Safe” Annuity Retirement Products and a Possible US Retirement Crisis Journal of Economic Issues Accepted 2024  Dr. Tom Lambert and Chris Tobe  https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4761980

Testimony by Ben S Bernanke, Federal Reserve, US House of Representatives, Washington DC, 24 March 2009 https://www.bis.org/review/r090325a.pdf

Private Equity is a Prohibited Transaction

/ ChrisTobe / Leave a comment

I have been writing about Private Equity not meeting the criteria for exemptions from being classified as Prohibited Transactions in ERISA plans. https://commonsense401kproject.com/2025/01/01/private-equity-in-401k-plans-a-fiduciary-minefield-for-plan-sponsors/  I haven’t received negative feedback from the industry, nor much input from those in financial transparency.  

⚖️ 1. Why It Should Be a Prohibited Transaction

Private Equity products often:

  • Charge high, opaque fees (violating the reasonable compensation prong),
  • Rely on complex, non-transparent disclosures (violating the no misleading statements prong),
  • Are marketed by non-fiduciary parties (violating care and loyalty obligations),
  • Fail to accept ERISA fiduciary status in the PE offering documents, disclaiming responsibility.

This makes them vulnerable on all four elements of the Impartial Conduct Standards, which apply to the DOL’s Prohibited Transaction Exemption (PTE) 2020-02 that governs conflicts of interest.

So, on its face, allowing Private Equity into 401(k)s should be a prohibited transaction unless a strong exemption applies.

🧩 2. How PE Tries to Avoid Prohibited Transaction Classification

Despite these red flags, here’s how PE sponsors and platforms often try to thread the needle:

A. Structuring through Commingled Products

PE is typically offered via:

  • Target Date Funds (TDFs) or
  • Collective Investment Trusts (CITs)
    These are multi-manager, pooled vehicles in which PE is only a sleeve. The fiduciary responsibilities then shift to the TDF or CIT manager, who may be a fiduciary — but the underlying PE managers are not.

➤ This layering dilutes fiduciary clarity and avoids direct ERISA responsibility for the PE firms themselves.

B. Relying on the DOL’s 2020 “Information Letter”

The Department of Labor’s 2020 Information Letter (requested by Pantheon and Partners Group) did not bless PE in DC plans, but it did not ban it either. It merely said:

“…a plan fiduciary would not violate the duties of prudence and loyalty per se by including PE as a component of a diversified investment option.”

This gave cover — but did not offer an exemption or remove fiduciary obligations. Yet many sponsors are treating it as a green light.

C. Outsourcing Fiduciary Responsibility

Plan sponsors may rely on third-party investment consultants (e.g., Mercer, Aon, Callan) or TDF providers (e.g., BlackRock, Fidelity) and claim reliance on prudence of the delegated manager.

However, delegation does not absolve fiduciary liability under ERISA § 405 (co-fiduciary liability), especially if the sponsor fails to monitor the advisor or conduct due diligence on PE’s costs, liquidity, and performance opacity.

📉 3. Why This Still Fails Under the Impartial Conduct Standards

The Impartial Conduct Standards (ICS) were developed under the DOL fiduciary rule and carried into PTE 2020-02, which applies when there are conflicted recommendations (e.g., plan fiduciaries profiting from fund inclusion or relying on conflicted consultants).

Private Equity fails ICS because:

  • Fees and valuation models are rarely benchmarked objectively.
  • Performance data is not standardized (e.g., IRRs vs. time-weighted returns).
  • Contracts often contain waivers of fiduciary duty, arbitration, or non-transparent fee disclosures.
  • There is often no fiduciary warranty under ERISA by the PE provider.

This opens the door to prohibited transaction claims, especially if the PE recommendation:

  • Directly or indirectly benefits the advisor/fiduciary financially.
  • Lacks documentation of a prudent process.

⚖️ 4. What Would Trigger Liability

Plaintiffs could pursue claims under:

  • ERISA §406(a) (dealing with conflicts of interest/self-dealing),
  • ERISA §404(a) (fiduciary duties of prudence and loyalty),
  • And potentially ICS violations under PTE 2020-02.

Courts and regulators could hold:

  • Plan fiduciaries liable for imprudence or prohibited transactions,
  • PE managers liable if they acted as de facto fiduciaries or benefited from self-dealing.

I think any plan sponsor who is pitched a Target date fund with any Private Equity, however small, to be wary.    Private Equity will sneak into Target Date Funds first, maybe at 5% then grow to perhaps 20% to increase fees.   BlackRock and Empower are cutting deals in which I believe they are getting lucrative fees from Private Equity in exchange for taking the fiduciary liability for the Private Equity in their target date funds.  I would think when looking at the Private Equity sleave, it would be a party in interest.   My contention is that if the Private Equity sleeve is a prohibited transaction, then the entire target date fund is a prohibited transaction. 

State Guarantee Associations behind Annuities are a Joke

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State Guaranty Associations are so flimsy that none are rated by S&P or Moody’s.  There is no money in them, the reserves are not in the association, only in the companies themselves. 

Most did not even pay out claims in the last major default, Executive Life – only Illinois and Pennsylvania associations made partial payments, only after court orders.

I asked ChatGPT about Guarantee Associations in the context of an ERISA Fiduciary and got the following response.

⚖️ ERISA Fiduciary Standards vs. State Guaranty Associations

1. Duty of Prudence and Care (§404(a)(1)(B))

ERISA requires fiduciaries to act:

“with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then prevailing…”

  • SIGAs do not meet the “prudent expert” standard.
    A prudent expert would not rely on:
    • An entity with no prefunding or reserve capital
    • No federal backing
    • No credit rating from any recognized rating agency
    • A history of failure to pay during systemic defaults (e.g., Executive Life)
  • As you noted, only Illinois and Pennsylvania eventually made partial payouts, and only after litigation. That alone defeats the fiduciary standard of prudent selection and monitoring.

2. Duty of Loyalty (§404(a)(1)(A))

Fiduciaries must act solely in the interest of participants and beneficiaries and for the exclusive purpose of providing benefits.

  • If a fiduciary chooses an annuity or insurance-based structure based on a belief that the SIGA will protect beneficiaries, without disclosing its inadequacy, they may be violating their loyalty duty.
  • Relying on industry marketing or regulatory illusion about SIGAs—when informed sources (like the Federal Reserve, EU regulators, and academics) have raised red flags—could be seen as self-serving or negligent.

3. Duty to Monitor and Evaluate Risk

ERISA fiduciaries must continually evaluate risks and the financial condition of providers.

  • Given the known systemic risks, including:
    • Private equity ownership of insurers (Kirti & Sarin 2020)
    • Long-duration illiquid assets in General Accounts
    • Minimal real oversight by state regulators
    • EU regulator concern in 2017 about systemic fragility of U.S. insurance regulation

…it’s arguable that no prudent fiduciary should rely solely—or even primarily—on SIGAs as a source of security.

📚 Supporting Academic and Regulatory Warnings

  • Lambert & Tobe (2024) – Warn of “a possible US retirement crisis” driven by misleading safety claims of annuities.
  • Todd & Wallace (1992, Fed Minneapolis) – Exposed the moral hazard of undercapitalized SIGAs and deceptive perceptions of insurance safety.
  • Perez (2016) – Documents political interference and regulatory capture at the state level.
  • EU Concerns (2017) – EU regulators raised cross-border solvency concerns for U.S. insurers, especially given weak state regulation.

🚫 What This Means for Fiduciary Actions

ERISA fiduciaries should not rely on State Guaranty Associations as a primary or sufficient reason to:

  • Justify annuity purchases for pension risk transfers (PRTs) or 401(k) plans.
  • Accept insurer counterparty risk without thorough, independent due diligence.
  • Claim “safety” without disclosing SIGA limits, lack of reserves, and legal uncertainty.

Instead, fiduciaries should:

  • Require contractual provisions for downgrade protections and capital reserves.
  • Insist on federal-level guarantees or fully collateralized structures.
  • Disclose the inadequacy of SIGAs in plan documents and fiduciary reports.

🧾 Bottom Line

State Guaranty Associations offer the illusion of safety, not the substance.
No fiduciary acting under the ERISA standard of prudence and loyalty should rely on them as a meaningful risk mitigator.

Annuities flunk Prohibited Transactions Exemption – SCOTUS ruling will open floodgates of litigation.

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Annuities have always flunked but no one has ever challenged them because of their total lack of transparency.  Now with SCOTUS Cornell decision, the burden of proof has shifted to the plans to defend why they think annuities are exempt from being prohibited transactions, and for the most part they are clueless.

Most annuities in most DC plans are labeled “parties in interest” because they have a relationship with the administrator/recordkeeper.   This relationship creates a potential conflict of interest and labeled a Prohibited Transaction.  A Prohibited Transaction Exemption (PTE) must be used to include the annuities in the plan.

PTE’s are subject to the ERISA Impartial Conduct Standards which are a set of requirements for fiduciaries providing investment advice to retirement investors, ensuring they act in the best interest of the client, receive reasonable compensation, and avoid making misleading statements. 

Annuities for decades have claimed Prohibited transaction exemptions behind PTE 84-24 and more recently PTE 2020-02 with few challenges or any accountability.[1]  However, the recent SCOTUS decision clearly says plans are responsible for verifying that their investments qualify for the prohibited transaction exemptions.  The PTEs that apply to the insurance products they put in their plans where most are “parties in interest” must meet the Impartial Conduct Standards.[2]     

Judge Lynn when ruling on Fixed Index Annuities in 2017 stated   Because “insurers generally reserve rights to change participation rates, interest caps, and fees,” FIAs can “effectively transfer investment risks from insurers to investors.”[3]  this control by insurers clearly violates Impartial Conduct Standards.[4]  

ERISA PTE 84-24, which is based on the Restatement of Trust, states the annuities must meet the following requirements called the Impartial Conduct Standards and Written Disclosures and Policies and Procedures backing up these standards.  Most annuities I have seen do not even come close.

The Impartial Conduct Standards have 4 major obligations.   A. Care Obligation    B. Loyalty Obligation C. Reasonable compensation limitation D. No materially misleading statements (including by omission)

Care Obligation This obligation reflects the care, skill, prudence, and diligence – similar to Prudent Person Fiduciary standard.   Diversification is one of the most basic fiduciary duties. Under the CFA pension trustee standard for acting with prudence and reasonable care the plan should seek appropriate levels of diversification.[5]    Fixed annuities flunk this diversification test with single entity credit and liquidity risk. [6] 

The Federal Reserve in April 2025 said “Life insurers continued to hold a significant share of risky and illiquid assets on their balance sheets” [7]  Under the CFA pension trustee standard Principle #3 to Act with skill competence and diligence it cites need for awareness of investments liquidity, and any other risks.  Certain types of investments …necessitate more thorough investigation and understanding than do fundamental investments, such as straightforward and transparent equity, fixed-income, or mutual fund products   Annuities call for more diligence by sponsors which needs to be fully documented by plans.  Plan sponsors could mitigate this credit and liquidity risk in their annuity contracts with downgrade clauses which allow liquidity at book value if the annuity issuer is downgraded but these type clauses have not been adopted for most plans.[8]

Loyalty Obligation Annuity contracts are designed to avoid all fiduciary obligation with no loyalty to participants. Diligence is nearly impossible with misleading, nontransparent contracts, and the lack of plan/participant ownership of securities. Secret kickbacks and commissions place the financial interests of the Insurers and their affiliates over those of retirement investors.  The new fiduciary rule requires the advisor to show their loyalty with a “Fiduciary Acknowledgement Disclosure.” which has been strongly opposed by the Annuity industry.   Plans typically agree to Annuity contracts that avoid any fiduciary language or responsibility on the part of the issuer. [9]   The Federal Reserve in 1992 exposed the varying weak state regulatory and reserve claims and most plans are not even aware of which state issued their annuity contract.[10]

Reasonable compensation limitation Annuities have a total lack of disclosure of profits, fees and compensation – effectively denying any chance for a prospective purchaser to make an “informed decision.”  CFA Institute Global Investment Performance Standards (GIPS) are transparency standards on performance and fees. Annuities typically do not comply with CFA GIPS standards.[11]

Noted Morningstar analyst John Rekenthaler said in April 2022 that in selecting 401(k) investment options, “inappropriate are investments that don’t price daily.”  Annuities typically do not price daily and do not provide valuation transparency.[12]

A number of lawsuits have settled with claims of excessive secret fees and spreads in annuities. An insurance executive bragged at a conference of fees over 200 basis points (2%) in 2013. [13]  In a report, Morningstar acknowledges that annuities fees inside 401(k) plans are challenging to understand.  ‘No insurer tells you what is in the spread.’    ‘Insurance firms collect a spread”[14]     I was quoted on NBC that the TIAA Fixed Annuity made spread fees of around 120 basis points.  TIAA makes $billions in undisclosed profits on their fixed annuity products. TIAA annuity has been called the company’s profit “engine” driving $46.2  in bonuses to their top five executives.[15]    These IPG fixed annuity contracts have been characterized by DC plan group NAGDCA as having serious fiduciary issues with hidden fees.  “Due to the fact that the plan sponsor does not own the underlying investments, the portfolio holdings, performance, risk, and management fees are generally not disclosed. This limits the ability of plan sponsors to compare returns with other SVFs [stable-value funds]. It also makes it nearly impossible for plan sponsors to know the fees (which can be increased without disclosure) paid by participants in these funds—a critical component of a fiduciary’s responsibility “ [16] 

No materially misleading statements (including by omission) Annuities have numerous material misleading statements in their contracts, including the total lack of disclosure of spread/fees.   Under the CFA pension trustee standard for policies Trustees should … draft written policies that include a discussion of risk tolerances, return objectives, liquidity requirements.[17] Plans with annuities many times do not have Investment Policy Statements or weak IPS that do not provide transparency or accountability for the annuities.[18]

The Annuity industry thrives on secret commissions.[19]  The GAO and Senator Warren reported on these commissions.[20] The annuity industry has fought the so-called Biden Fiduciary rule which would expose many annuity commissions in 401(k) plans.   The annuity industry trade group that coordinates weak state insurance commissioners National Association Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) best interest rule was ridiculed by a DOL Official “compensation is not considered a conflict of interest,” All 50 State Insurance Commissioners have rejected Fiduciary standards by adopting the NAIC best interest rules.[21]

Annuities claim principal protection, but some fixed annuity contracts recently have “broken the buck” and violated their contracts by forcing significant losses on participants.  The written disclosures under weak state regulations omit critical information on risks and fees also prevents any opportunity for an “informed decision.”

Conclusion

Annuities clearly flunk all 4 major obligations of the Impartial Conduct Standards and are not exempt as Prohibited Transactions. 

Plans with annuities have huge fiduciary liabilities which grow larger each year.  With the new Supreme Court Case CunninghamV.Cornell the risk of litigation, and potential damages have grown greatly. [22]  Within 2 weeks of the decision a case of annuities as prohibited transactions has already been filed.

Plan sponsors should amend their Annuity contracts to at least stop the growth of fiduciary liability.

1. A Most Favored Nation (MFN) clause to make sure they have the best rate/largest payouts/ lowest spread fees of all the annuity providers similar clients

2. A downgrade clause that allows liquidity at full book value if the insurance company issuing the annuity is downgraded.

3. Annuity provider agrees to be ERISA Fiduciary

If they cannot get these 3 clauses – the plan must demand that the annuity provider let them out of the contract, and if not consider legal action against the insurance company.

[1] https://commonsense401kproject.com/2024/11/19/burden-of-proof-is-on-plan-sponsors-hoping-to-qualifyfor-annuity-prohibited-transactions-exemption/

[2] https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-labor-report/high-courts-cornell-ruling-stands-to-supercharge-401k-suits

[3] Chamber of Commerce of the United States, et. al. v Hugler, 231 F. Supp. 3d 152 (N.D. Tex. 2017) (Lynn decision), 187

[4] Attorney James Watkins writes on the Fiduciary Risks of Annuities

Plan Sponsor and RIA Alert: Navigating the 78(3) Fiduciary Liability “Gotcha”

[5] https://rpc.cfainstitute.org/codes-and-standards/pension-trustee-code

[6] “Safe” Annuity Retirement Products and a Possible US Retirement Crisis   Dr. Tom Lambert and Chris Tobe  https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4761980

[7] https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/files/financial-stability-report-20250425.pdf

[8] American Academy of Actuaries Report of the GIC With Credit Rating Downgrade  October 1999 https://www.actuary.org/sites/default/files/pdf/life/gic.pdf

[9] https://commonsense401kproject.com/2024/11/19/burden-of-proof-is-on-plan-sponsors-hoping-to-qualifyfor-annuity-prohibited-transactions-exemption/

[10] . Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Summer 1992  Todd, Wallace  SPDA’s and GIC’s http://www.minneapolisfed.org/research/QR/QR1631.pdf

[11] https://rpc.cfainstitute.org/-/media/documents/book/rf-publication/2017/rf-v2017-n3-1.pdf

https://www.cfainstitute.org/en/membership/professional-development/refresher-readings/gips-overview

[12]https://www.morningstar.com/articles/1090732/what-belongs-in-401k-plans

[13] Annuity Executive brags on 200bps 2% fees https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-03-06/prudential-says-annuity-fees-would-make-bankers-dance?embedded-checkout=true

[14] https://riabiz.com/a/2024/5/11/fidelity-voya-and-boa-smooth-blackrocks-launch-of-guaranteed-paycheck-etfs-but-401k-plan-participants-may-yet-balk-at-high-unseeable-fees-and-intangibility-of-benefits

[15] https://www.nbcnews.com/investigations/tiaa-pushes-costly-retirement-products-cover-losses-whistleblower-rcna161198

[16] http://www.nagdca.org/documents/StableValueFunds.pdf_ The National Association of Government Defined Contribution Administrators, Inc. (NAGDCA) September 2010

[17][17] https://rpc.cfainstitute.org/codes-and-standards/pension-trustee-code

[18] https://commonsense401kproject.com/2023/03/12/investment-policy-statements-crucial-to-fiduciary-duty/

[19] Consumer Federation of America on Biden Annuity Rule https://consumerfed.org/annuity-industry-kickbacks-cost-retirement-savers-billions/

[20] https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-24-104632   and Senator Warrens reported on Annuity kickbacks.[xiii]   https://www.warren.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/senator_warrens_annuity_report_-_sept_2024.pdf

[21] https://401kspecialistmag.com/all-50-states-now-on-board-with-naic-best-interest-annuity-rule/

[22]   https://commonsense401kproject.com/2025/04/21/scotus-9-0-erisa-decision-in-cunningham-v-cornell-university-case-confirms-my-view-on-annuities-as-prohibited-transactions/