
By Christopher B. Tobe, CFA, CAIA
November 20, 2026
A new financial news story exposes a simple but devastating problem in America’s 401(k) system: retirees can lose thousands of dollars annually when insurance companies credit artificially low interest rates on fixed annuity contracts buried inside their retirement plans. A growing wave of ERISA litigation suggests this is not an isolated problem. It is a systemic failure of fiduciary oversight, insurance-company compensation disclosure, and federal retirement regulation.
On November 19, financial journalist Gerelyn Terzo published an important story in 24/7 Wall St., examining how hidden stable value spreads can damage retirement savings and came up with the following example:
At age 63, a worker approaching retirement moves $400,000 from stocks into the stable value option in his 401(k). He wants to preserve principal, reduce volatility, and earn a reasonable fixed return.
But what if the insurance company managing that money credits him only 3%, when a comparable contract could reasonably have paid 4%, 5%, or more?
The difference is enormous.
Annual lost interest on a $400,000 retirement balance
$4,000
1% shortfall
$8,000
2% shortfall
$12,000
3% shortfall
Illustrative annual differences, assuming a constant $400,000 balance, before compounding or withdrawals.
Over ten years, even a one-percentage-point shortfall could mean tens of thousands of dollars in lost retirement wealth.
This is not simply a story about investors choosing the wrong mutual fund. It is about insurance companies that may control both the investment contract and the interest rate paid to participants, while keeping the economics of those contracts largely hidden.
And increasingly, plaintiffs’ attorneys are challenging those arrangements in federal court.
Nationwide’s $12.9 Million Settlement: The Insurance Company Was on Both Sides of the Transaction
Terzo’s article, He Moves $400,000 of His 401(k) Into Its Stable Value Fund at 63, highlights the proposed $12.9 million settlement involving Nationwide’s own employee retirement plan.
24/7 Wall St.
This is particularly revealing because Nationwide was not merely an outside insurance company selling a retirement product.
Nationwide’s own employees were investing retirement savings in a Nationwide insurance contract.
The arrangement created an obvious conflict requiring serious independent fiduciary scrutiny.
The case, Sweeney v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., involved a Nationwide Guaranteed Fund backed by a group annuity contract issued by Nationwide Life Insurance Company.
According to NAPA’s November 6 reporting:
- Nationwide Life invested the retirement assets in its general account.
- Nationwide controlled the contract’s credited interest rate.
- Plaintiffs alleged that the spread retained by the insurer was excessive.
- Plaintiffs also alleged that fiduciaries failed to prudently monitor the arrangement.
- Nationwide disputed the allegations and denied wrongdoing.
The plaintiffs’ expert calculated $63.7 million in alleged excess fees through the second quarter of 2023, with an estimated present value of $74 million. The proposed settlement of $12.9 million would resolve the litigation without a finding of liability.
napa-net.org
Nationwide litigation — key figures
$74M
Present value of alleged losses
$12.9M
Proposed settlement
83–85K
Estimated class members
17–20%
Settlement relative to alleged losses
Source: NAPA, November 6, 2026. Settlement remains subject to court approval.
The Nationwide Guaranteed Fund reportedly credited rates in the neighborhood of 3% to 3.5% during relevant periods. But the critical question is not whether 3.5% sounds reasonable to a retirement participant.
The question is whether the contract’s rate was reasonable given the insurer’s investment earnings, risks, expenses, comparable contracts, and compensation retained.
A low crediting rate can function economically like an excessive investment-management fee, even when no explicit fee appears on the participant’s statement.
That is the central issue that deserves far more attention.
A Growing Wave of Stable Value and Fixed Annuity Litigation
Nationwide is not alone.
Over the past several years, litigation has challenged fixed annuity and stable value arrangements involving employers, insurers, hospitals, and large retirement plans.
The cases and defendants associated with this broader litigation landscape include:
| Employer or plan | Principal issue worth examining |
| Nationwide | Proprietary guaranteed fund, insurer spread and crediting rate |
| Norton Healthcare — Disselkamp | Fixed annuity/stable value fiduciary oversight |
| Columbus healthcare-related litigation | Guaranteed investment returns and fiduciary monitoring |
| Cigna / MetLife | Insurer contracts, compensation and conflicts |
| Serco | Stable value investment selection and monitoring |
| SeaWorld | Fixed income and retirement-plan fiduciary practices |
| AutoZone | Guaranteed account economics and plan oversight |
| Cedars-Sinai | Insurance and retirement investment arrangements |
| Mitsubishi Chemical | Stable value/annuity contract monitoring |
| Jack Henry | Fixed account investment and compensation questions |
These are cases I have reason to believe have settled, but they vary greatly in size and scope.
The Difference Between a General Account Annuity and Genuine Diversified Stable Value
One of the biggest problems in retirement litigation is the tendency to lump very different products together under the label stable value.
In my October 2025 article, The Stable Value Efficient Frontier, I argued that fiduciaries need to examine both returns and risks.
There are two fundamentally different structures.
General account fixed annuity: The insurer owns the underlying investment assets, assumes contractual obligations, and promises participants a crediting rate. The plan is exposed to the insurer’s claims-paying ability, subject to the contract’s protections and terms. The insurer generally retains the difference between portfolio earnings and its credited interest, after expenses and other costs.
Diversified synthetic stable value: The plan or trust owns a diversified portfolio of underlying fixed-income securities. Wrap contracts provide book-value protections subject to contractual conditions. Fees and asset ownership are generally more transparent, although wrap providers still introduce counterparty risk.
| Feature | General account annuity | Synthetic stable value |
| Underlying asset ownership | Insurer | Plan or trust |
| Principal credit exposure | Concentrated in insurer | Diversified assets plus wrap counterparties |
| Compensation transparency | Often embedded in spread | Generally more explicit |
| Crediting-rate mechanism | Contractual insurer formula/discretion | Portfolio and wrap-based formula |
| Liquidity | Contract dependent | Contract dependent |
| Fiduciary concern | Spread, insurer risk, conflicts | Portfolio, wrap costs, liquidity |
The comparison matters because a general account annuity with a 3% crediting rate is not automatically comparable to a synthetic stable value fund crediting 3%.
The underlying risk may be dramatically different.
In my research, I have argued that concentrated general account insurer exposure can present substantially greater credit risk than a diversified synthetic stable value structure. The precise risk multiple depends on the methodology, portfolio, insurer, and wrap counterparties.
A prudent fiduciary should not accept a lower return for a materially riskier product without a compelling economic justification.
And when the insurer is also the recordkeeper or another party in interest to the plan, the conflict deserves even greater scrutiny.
TIAA: The Same Hidden Spread Problem, but a Different Legal Setting
The Nationwide settlement also raises an important question about TIAA.
In September 2025, NBC News published Gretchen Morgenson’s investigation of Rhode Island sheriffs who encountered serious restrictions on accessing their retirement savings held in TIAA annuities.
In that investigation, I estimated that TIAA retained approximately 150 basis points in hidden annual spread compensation.
TIAA declined to disclose its precise investment margin, describing the information as proprietary.
As I explained in TIAA Exposed for Excessive Hidden Annuity Spread Fees — Again, the issue extends well beyond the quoted interest rate.
The CommonSense 401k Project
Consider the economics of a 150-basis-point spread.
On a $400,000 annuity balance, 1.5% represents $6,000 annually.
On $1 billion in annuity liabilities, it represents $15 million annually.
While not every dollar of an insurer’s spread is profit or an excessive fee, the vast majority is. Insurers will claim expenses, and capital costs, but based on my 7 years of experience I estimate it to be low, under 20 basis points, which is why they refuse to disclose it. .
How much of the investment return belongs to the retirement saver, and how much does the insurer retain?
The ERISA Prohibited Transaction Problem
The next generation of annuity litigation should examine more than whether a crediting rate was imprudently low.
It should examine whether the underlying insurance contract constitutes a prohibited transaction.
ERISA Section 406 restricts transactions between a retirement plan and parties in interest. Insurers, recordkeepers, and other service providers may fall within that definition.
Where an insurer already provides services to a plan and also issues a proprietary general account annuity, the contract raises potential prohibited-transaction questions.
The analysis must address the statutory elements, applicable exemptions, and whether the insurer’s compensation is reasonable.
In my article, Annuities Are a Prohibited Transaction — DOL Exemptions Do Not Work, I argued that undisclosed spreads, concentrated credit risk, and restrictive liquidity provisions make many insurance arrangements difficult to reconcile with ERISA’s fiduciary standards.
The Supreme Court’s unanimous 2025 decision in Cunningham v. Cornell University strengthens scrutiny of these transactions by treating statutory exemptions as affirmative defenses rather than elements plaintiffs must negate in their complaints.
That does not mean every annuity is automatically unlawful or that every exemption fails. It does mean that fiduciaries and insurers cannot simply assume an affiliated contract is permissible without analyzing the exemption requirements.
The Nationwide case was principally litigated as a prudence and monitoring dispute, not a final judicial determination that the annuity constituted a nonexempt prohibited transaction.
But its economics illustrate why prohibited-transaction scrutiny matters.
The Hidden Risk Behind Higher Annuity Yields
There is another side to this problem.
An insurance company can increase its profitability by paying participants less.
But it can also attempt to increase profitability by taking greater risks with the assets supporting its annuity obligations.
That brings us to private credit, private equity-owned insurers, structured securities, and offshore reinsurance.
In my August 2026 article, New York vs. Iowa Annuities: Where Does the Extra Spread Come From?, I examined how insurer domicile, investment restrictions, capital requirements, and reinsurance arrangements can influence the economics of annuity contracts.
Congress Needs to Expose the Spread
The proposed federal 401(k) transparency legislation I introduced in November 2026 is designed to address precisely this kind of opacity.
The legislation focuses on private equity, private credit, collective investment trusts, annuities, and other investments that can conceal underlying costs, risks, and valuations.
I outline this in my November 2026 panel discussion Capital Group Insurance at National Press Club in DC https://commonsense401kproject.com/2026/11/18/follow-the-fees/
The Nationwide settlement illustrates why the legislation should explicitly require additional disclosures for general account fixed annuities.
At a minimum, Congress should require:
1. Full insurer spread disclosure. Annual reporting of gross portfolio earnings, credited interest, investment expenses, capital and risk charges, and compensation retained by the insurer, with a consistent methodology for allocating general account results.
2. Comparable crediting-rate disclosures. Fiduciaries should receive meaningful comparisons against similar general account annuities, including products offered by the same insurer to other retirement plans.
3. Risk-adjusted comparisons. Plans should evaluate both competing general account annuities and diversified synthetic stable value products, accounting for differences in credit, duration, liquidity, and contract protections.
4. Prohibited-transaction documentation. Fiduciaries should identify all affiliated insurers and service providers, disclose direct and indirect compensation, and document the legal basis for any applicable exemption.
5. Downgrade and exit protections. Contracts should provide meaningful remedies if an insurer’s financial condition deteriorates, with transparent market-value adjustments and termination terms.
6. Underlying investment and reinsurance transparency. Insurers should disclose material exposure to private credit, affiliated investments, structured assets, and offshore reinsurance arrangements, subject to appropriate protections for genuinely confidential information.
These reforms would not prohibit legitimate insurance-company profits.
They would require those profits to withstand independent scrutiny.
Conclusion: Retirees Deserve the Interest Their Money Earns
Gerelyn Terzo’s November 19 article makes the hidden spread problem understandable to ordinary retirement savers.
One percentage point on $400,000 means $4,000 annually.
That is money a retiree could use for housing, healthcare, groceries, or simply maintaining financial independence.
The Nationwide settlement shows that the underlying economics can involve tens of millions of dollars in disputed compensation.
The TIAA controversy shows that similar transparency and liquidity concerns extend beyond ERISA-covered 401(k) plans.
And the broader litigation against insurers and retirement-plan fiduciaries shows why Congress and the Department of Labor need to examine these arrangements more aggressively.
The retirement industry has spent decades telling participants to focus on visible fees. But some of the largest economic costs in fixed annuities may never appear as a fee at all. They are embedded in the interest rate the participant never receives.
A 401(k) participant should not need a federal class action to discover how much an insurance company earns from their retirement savings.
That information should be disclosed before the contract is purchased, monitored throughout its life, and available to participants and regulators.
If Wall Street wants to call these products guaranteed, it should first guarantee transparency.
Selected sources and related CommonSense research
- Gerelyn Terzo, 24/7 Wall St. — November 19, 2026
- Nevin E. Adams, NAPA — Nationwide’s proposed $12.9 million settlement
- NBC News — Rhode Island sheriffs and TIAA annuity controversy
- The Stable Value Efficient Frontier
- Annuities Are a Prohibited Transaction — DOL Exemptions Do Not Work
- TIAA Exposed for Excessive Hidden Annuity Spread Fees — Again








