Weak Standards Make Annuities Prohibited Transactions in ERISA Plans

Introduction

ERISA was enacted to impose strict fiduciary, accounting, and investment performance standards on retirement plan assets. SEC-registered mutual funds must meet these standards through transparent reporting, daily pricing, and oversight by independent boards. By contrast, insurance-based annuities operate under weaker fiduciary standards, opaque accounting rules, and undisclosed performance spreads, making them unlikely to qualify for an exemption from ERISA’s prohibited transaction rules.¹

As my earlier analyses demonstrate, annuities have become a gateway drug that opened the door to non-standard accounting and conflicted arrangements in retirement plans.²

I. Fiduciary Standards: ERISA §404(a) vs. NAIC Rule 275

ERISA §404(a) imposes explicit duties of prudence and loyalty, requiring fiduciaries to act solely in the interest of participants and beneficiaries. By contrast, NAIC Rule 275, the state insurance ‘best interest’ standard, does not include a loyalty duty and permits conflicts of interest if disclosures are made.³ Plan fiduciaries cannot rely on NAIC compliance to meet ERISA duties. A product that satisfies Rule 275 may still violate ERISA’s exclusive benefit rule, making it a prohibited transaction.

II. Accounting Standards: Book Value vs. Market Value

Mutual funds must report daily mark-to-market NAVs under SEC rules, fully reflecting gains and losses. Annuities, especially General Account or Separate Account contracts, are governed by statutory accounting. Assets are often held at amortized cost, meaning losses are hidden unless realized. Portfolios frequently contain 30–50% private credit and alternatives.⁴ Book-value accounting disguises true risk, making annuities appear ‘safe’ when underlying portfolios may be volatile or impaired.

III. Investment Performance Standards: Spreads and Opaqueness

Mutual funds disclose expense ratios, portfolio holdings, and benchmark comparisons. Annuities credit 2–3% to participants while earning 6–7% on general account assets. The undisclosed spread—sometimes over 400 basis points—represents pure insurer profit.⁵ This opacity prevents fiduciaries from assessing the reasonableness of compensation, triggering ERISA §406(b) self-dealing prohibitions.

IV. Conflicted Providers and “Party in Interest” Risks

In many 401(k) plans, the recordkeeper is also the annuity provider. As Cunningham v. Cornell highlighted, this dual role creates inherent conflicts of interest. When insurers steer plan assets into affiliated annuities, fiduciaries face direct exposure under the prohibited transaction rules.⁶

V. Transparency Suppression: Prudential and NAIC RBC Proposal

Prudential, domiciled in New Jersey, shields its quarterly solvency filings under N.J. Stat. §17-23-1, denying plan fiduciaries access to critical risk data.⁷ The NAIC Capital Adequacy Task Force has proposed banning public disclosure of insurer Risk-Based Capital (RBC) scores, even though the Society of Actuaries warns that transparency is essential.⁸ Fiduciaries cannot evaluate insurer solvency without this data, a critical factor in selecting annuities.

VI. Litigation Outlook

The Supreme Court has already narrowed available exemptions from prohibited transaction rules.² Combined with weak fiduciary standards, opaque accounting, undisclosed spreads, and active suppression of solvency data, annuities present a litigation time bomb: plaintiffs will argue that fiduciaries cannot prudently select annuities without access to solvency and fee data. Courts will increasingly view annuities as per se prohibited transactions absent full transparency. Most annuities do not have downgrade provisions, so their liquidity risks go up simultaneously with their credit risk. Fabozzi, in the 1998 Handbook of stable value, says that General Account fixed annuities have 10 times the risk of synthetic diversified stable value.

Conclusion

Annuities fail across three pillars: fiduciary duties, accounting standards, and performance transparency. SEC-registered mutual funds meet all three; annuities meet none. By continuing to rely on these weaker standards, insurers are ensuring that their products will be viewed as prohibited transactions under ERISA, and plan fiduciaries who adopt them will face heightened litigation risk.

Footnotes

¹ ERISA §406; see also https://commonsense401kproject.com/2025/06/13/annuities-are-prohibited-transactions-via-chat-gpt/
² https://commonsense401kproject.com/2025/05/10/annuities-flunk-prohibited-transactions-exemption-scotus-ruling-will-open-floodgates-of-litigation/
³ Comparison of ERISA §404(a) with NAIC Rule 275; see also https://commonsense401kproject.com/2025/07/27/diversification-abandoned-why-plan-fiduciaries-must-rethink-fixed-annuities-and-pension-risk-transfers/
https://commonsense401kproject.com/2025/08/12/4-sets-of-books-how-trumps-401k-push-opens-the-door-to-accounting-chaos/
⁵ Spread profits analysis; see https://commonsense401kproject.com/2025/06/24/state-guarantee-associations-behind-annuities-are-a-joke/
⁶ Cunningham v. Cornell Univ., 86 F.4th 961 (2d Cir. 2023).
⁷ N.J. Stat. §17-23-1.
⁸ NAIC, Capital Adequacy Task Force, Special National Meeting Packet (2025), p.56.

SOURCES

The Handbook of Stable Value Investments 1st Edition by Frank J. Fabozzi 1998 Jacquelin Griffin Evaluating Wrap Provider Credit Risk in Synthetic GICs pg. 272 https://www.amazon.com/Handbook-Stable-Value-Investments/dp/1883249422

National Association of Government Defined Contribution Administrators.  2010.  2010 Issue Brochure – What Plan Sponsors Should Know About Stable Value Funds (SVF) www.nagdca.org/documents/StableValueFunds.pdf

Shames, Mitch.  2022.  “Annuities: The straw that breaks the back of retirement plan fiduciaries,” Benefits Pro.  May 3, 2022.  https://www.benefitspro.com/2022/05/03/annuities-the-straw-that-breaks-the-back-of-retirement-plan-fiduciaries/?slreturn=20240312164319 .  Accessed on March 12, 2024.

Tobe, Christopher B.  2004. “The Consultants Guide to Stable Value.”  Journal of Investment Consulting, 7(1), Summer 2004, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=577603 .  Accessed on March 12, 2024. 

Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Summer 1992 Todd, Wallace SPDA’s and GIC’s http://www.minneapolisfed.org/research/QR/QR1631.pdf

“Safe” Annuity Retirement Products and a Possible US Retirement Crisis Journal of Economic Issues Accepted 2024  Dr. Tom Lambert and Chris Tobe  https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4761980

Testimony by Ben S Bernanke, Federal Reserve, US House of Representatives, Washington DC, 24 March 2009 https://www.bis.org/review/r090325a.pdf

ERISA Advisory Council Testimony released

Our (Chris Tobe, CFA,CAIA & James Watkins Esq) summary of our testimony from July 24 on QDIAs in 401ks to the ERISA Advisory Council was released. Of the many witnesses I believe Jim and I urged the most caution and emphasized the need for transparency. You can read the full reports at https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/EBSA/about-ebsa/about-us/erisa-advisory-council/2024-qdia.pdf https://www.psca.org/news/psca-news/2025/5/full-qdia-report-released-by-erisa-advisory-council/

Our portion is below –

 Investment Fiduciaries James Watkins and Chris Tobe 

James Watkins is an attorney with Invest Sense LLC. His current practice provides forensic fiduciary audits for plans and other trustees. Chris Tobe is the Chief Investment Officer for the Hackett Robertson Tobe Group. He works as a consultant to retirement plans and serves as a litigation consultant.

Mr. Watkins stated there are three cases that he refers to as the “responsibility trinity,” that defines the area of fiduciary responsibility right now: 1. Tibble v. Edison – recognized the Restatement of Trusts (Restatement) as a legitimate resource in resolving fiduciary issues and ruled that a plan sponsor has an ongoing fiduciary duty to monitor plan investment options for prudence 2. Hughes v. Northwestern – ruled that a plan sponsor has a fiduciary duty to ensure that each investment option within a plan is prudent and to remove any that are not 3. Brotherston v. Putnam – ruled that comparable index funds can be used for benchmarking purposes, citing Section 100 b(1) of the Restatement, that index funds are proper comparators Mr. Watkins stressed that he is a big proponent of cost benefit analysis and believes the math is not that hard to do, especially as it is being used to determine whether an investment is in the best interest of a participant. Mr. Watkins stated that the industry does not support his focus on cost benefit analysis given studies that show the majority of actively managed funds are not cost efficient.

   Regarding annuities within a QDIA, Mr. Watkins noted that he most often is asked by the plan sponsor considering an in-plan annuity solution whether a participant can get out of it, and if so, how. Mr. Watkins’s understanding is the only way a participant can get out of an annuity without harsh tax penalties is to do a 1035 exchange (a tax-free exchange of an existing annuity contract, life insurance policy, or endowment for another of like kind). Mr. Watkins stated that he is aware of a lot of annuity providers trying to embed annuities into target date funds within qualified plans. He suggested that this raises the question about the 50 feasibility of a 1035 exchange in a qualified plan, and whether it is the only way you can make this move or can a participant make an exchange from a like product to another like product.

  Mr. Watkins thinks that enhanced disclosures should be provided to participants with the appropriate information to ensure that they understand the annuity product, which should include the conditions for them to “break even” and how that would work if they were to surrender the annuity contract. Mr. Watkins stated that, if annuities are embedded in QDIAs, there needs to be much more meaningful, clear, and simple disclosures provided to enable the participant to make an informed decision and comply with IRC section 404(c). Mr. Watkins concluded by stating he does not believe annuities should be offered in a plan nor specifically in a QDIA. If ERISA does not require that a plan offer guaranteed income products or annuities, he does not see a reason to do so. His biggest concern is that once a participant is in an annuity, they lose control and are locked in. Mr. Watkins was asked if he has seen any ERISA 3(38) fiduciaries (those who have the authority to buy and sell assets, make strategic decisions, and otherwise handle all aspects of account investing) implementing annuity solutions in collective investment trusts or in unregistered products. He indicated that many plan sponsors are encountering products embedded in collective investment trusts and a lot of proprietary products. He believes that collective investment trusts are not transparent enough and participants do not understand or have access to information, as they would in a mutual fund that posts information in a newspaper or Morningstar. He stated that collective investment trusts typically do not publicly publish their performance results or their fees.

  Mr. Tobe began his testimony by stating that target date funds hold 50% of all 401(k) assets and thinks they deserve more fiduciary oversight by regulatory agencies. Historically, TDFs have been primarily offered in mutual funds registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), but the trend is that more target date assets are flowing into weakly regulated state collective investment trusts. The SEC does not allow investments in annuities, crypto currency, and private equity, for example, in mutual funds. By contrast, state-governed collective investment trusts do permit these types of investments, and do not offer the same level of disclosures and transparency as mutual funds. They also have lower capital requirements as well. 51 Mr. Tobe suggested the Council should examine federally-regulated investment vehicles being used as they are more transparent. He believes that collective investment trusts should become federally-regulated rather than being regulated at a state level. He noted that there are some collective investment trusts that are superior to mutual funds because they are “clones of a mutual fund” but have lower fees.

    In his opinion, the collective investment trusts being offered by insurance companies are deploying illiquid investments (annuities, private equity). He stated that this is just a way to get highpriced annuities into the mainstream target date fund solutions. He raised concerns that there are no requirements for the insurance companies to disclose interest spreads, and that there is no transparency into the revenue that the insurance companies are earning. Mr. Tobe believes that QDIAs should be held to the highest standard, that all investments should be held to the highest federal standards, such as compliance with Global Investment Performance Standards, and that the Department should be pushing for more transparency for collective investment trusts. Mr. Tobe testified that he would not recommend annuities, private equity or crypto currency in any DC plan or embedded in a QDIA as those investments are too expensive and risky right now. When asked how participants should protect themselves from market volatility, Mr. Tobe suggested that a participant should move into the lowest risk target date fund; annuities bear embedded risks that are not readily transparent to the holder. He believes that annuities could be downgraded and that insurance companies have high default risk that translates to high risk for that component of a participants’ investment. He stated that the risks for partial annuitization are the same until there is more transparency and information on annuities.

Mr. Watkins stated that a lot of the concerns could be addressed if the insurance companies could guarantee that annuities could provide a commensurate return, but historically that has been very expensive.

  Some Council members noted this was inconsistent with their professional experience and 52 suggested it should be researched further. Members of Council also questioned the witnesses’ opinions regarding the insurance companies default risks, noting that historical failure of insurance companies has been very low and less than 0.03%.

When asked where they would want to see changes that would provide them with comfort with the annuity products, Mr. Tobe suggested federal regulations that oversee the insurance agencies, coordinated in partnership with the Department for ERISA-based assets. When asked what level of fees and risk would satisfy the witnesses that a product is worthwhile, Mr. Watkins responded that the issuer would need to provide a cost benefit analysis that shows the return and guarantee. Mr. Tobe also offered a detailed example of how to diversify over 4 to 5 insurance companies to minimize the default risk and use synthetic stable value-like solutions for annuities to keep the fees low.   

   When asked if defined contribution plans should only use mutual funds due to their greater transparency, Mr. Tobe replied no and that he would rather see greater transparency requirements for collective investment trusts.