ERISA Advisory Council Testimony released

Our (Chris Tobe, CFA,CAIA & James Watkins Esq) summary of our testimony from July 24 on QDIAs in 401ks to the ERISA Advisory Council was released. Of the many witnesses I believe Jim and I urged the most caution and emphasized the need for transparency. You can read the full reports at https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/EBSA/about-ebsa/about-us/erisa-advisory-council/2024-qdia.pdf https://www.psca.org/news/psca-news/2025/5/full-qdia-report-released-by-erisa-advisory-council/

Our portion is below –

 Investment Fiduciaries James Watkins and Chris Tobe 

James Watkins is an attorney with Invest Sense LLC. His current practice provides forensic fiduciary audits for plans and other trustees. Chris Tobe is the Chief Investment Officer for the Hackett Robertson Tobe Group. He works as a consultant to retirement plans and serves as a litigation consultant.

Mr. Watkins stated there are three cases that he refers to as the “responsibility trinity,” that defines the area of fiduciary responsibility right now: 1. Tibble v. Edison – recognized the Restatement of Trusts (Restatement) as a legitimate resource in resolving fiduciary issues and ruled that a plan sponsor has an ongoing fiduciary duty to monitor plan investment options for prudence 2. Hughes v. Northwestern – ruled that a plan sponsor has a fiduciary duty to ensure that each investment option within a plan is prudent and to remove any that are not 3. Brotherston v. Putnam – ruled that comparable index funds can be used for benchmarking purposes, citing Section 100 b(1) of the Restatement, that index funds are proper comparators Mr. Watkins stressed that he is a big proponent of cost benefit analysis and believes the math is not that hard to do, especially as it is being used to determine whether an investment is in the best interest of a participant. Mr. Watkins stated that the industry does not support his focus on cost benefit analysis given studies that show the majority of actively managed funds are not cost efficient.

   Regarding annuities within a QDIA, Mr. Watkins noted that he most often is asked by the plan sponsor considering an in-plan annuity solution whether a participant can get out of it, and if so, how. Mr. Watkins’s understanding is the only way a participant can get out of an annuity without harsh tax penalties is to do a 1035 exchange (a tax-free exchange of an existing annuity contract, life insurance policy, or endowment for another of like kind). Mr. Watkins stated that he is aware of a lot of annuity providers trying to embed annuities into target date funds within qualified plans. He suggested that this raises the question about the 50 feasibility of a 1035 exchange in a qualified plan, and whether it is the only way you can make this move or can a participant make an exchange from a like product to another like product.

  Mr. Watkins thinks that enhanced disclosures should be provided to participants with the appropriate information to ensure that they understand the annuity product, which should include the conditions for them to “break even” and how that would work if they were to surrender the annuity contract. Mr. Watkins stated that, if annuities are embedded in QDIAs, there needs to be much more meaningful, clear, and simple disclosures provided to enable the participant to make an informed decision and comply with IRC section 404(c). Mr. Watkins concluded by stating he does not believe annuities should be offered in a plan nor specifically in a QDIA. If ERISA does not require that a plan offer guaranteed income products or annuities, he does not see a reason to do so. His biggest concern is that once a participant is in an annuity, they lose control and are locked in. Mr. Watkins was asked if he has seen any ERISA 3(38) fiduciaries (those who have the authority to buy and sell assets, make strategic decisions, and otherwise handle all aspects of account investing) implementing annuity solutions in collective investment trusts or in unregistered products. He indicated that many plan sponsors are encountering products embedded in collective investment trusts and a lot of proprietary products. He believes that collective investment trusts are not transparent enough and participants do not understand or have access to information, as they would in a mutual fund that posts information in a newspaper or Morningstar. He stated that collective investment trusts typically do not publicly publish their performance results or their fees.

  Mr. Tobe began his testimony by stating that target date funds hold 50% of all 401(k) assets and thinks they deserve more fiduciary oversight by regulatory agencies. Historically, TDFs have been primarily offered in mutual funds registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), but the trend is that more target date assets are flowing into weakly regulated state collective investment trusts. The SEC does not allow investments in annuities, crypto currency, and private equity, for example, in mutual funds. By contrast, state-governed collective investment trusts do permit these types of investments, and do not offer the same level of disclosures and transparency as mutual funds. They also have lower capital requirements as well. 51 Mr. Tobe suggested the Council should examine federally-regulated investment vehicles being used as they are more transparent. He believes that collective investment trusts should become federally-regulated rather than being regulated at a state level. He noted that there are some collective investment trusts that are superior to mutual funds because they are “clones of a mutual fund” but have lower fees.

    In his opinion, the collective investment trusts being offered by insurance companies are deploying illiquid investments (annuities, private equity). He stated that this is just a way to get highpriced annuities into the mainstream target date fund solutions. He raised concerns that there are no requirements for the insurance companies to disclose interest spreads, and that there is no transparency into the revenue that the insurance companies are earning. Mr. Tobe believes that QDIAs should be held to the highest standard, that all investments should be held to the highest federal standards, such as compliance with Global Investment Performance Standards, and that the Department should be pushing for more transparency for collective investment trusts. Mr. Tobe testified that he would not recommend annuities, private equity or crypto currency in any DC plan or embedded in a QDIA as those investments are too expensive and risky right now. When asked how participants should protect themselves from market volatility, Mr. Tobe suggested that a participant should move into the lowest risk target date fund; annuities bear embedded risks that are not readily transparent to the holder. He believes that annuities could be downgraded and that insurance companies have high default risk that translates to high risk for that component of a participants’ investment. He stated that the risks for partial annuitization are the same until there is more transparency and information on annuities.

Mr. Watkins stated that a lot of the concerns could be addressed if the insurance companies could guarantee that annuities could provide a commensurate return, but historically that has been very expensive.

  Some Council members noted this was inconsistent with their professional experience and 52 suggested it should be researched further. Members of Council also questioned the witnesses’ opinions regarding the insurance companies default risks, noting that historical failure of insurance companies has been very low and less than 0.03%.

When asked where they would want to see changes that would provide them with comfort with the annuity products, Mr. Tobe suggested federal regulations that oversee the insurance agencies, coordinated in partnership with the Department for ERISA-based assets. When asked what level of fees and risk would satisfy the witnesses that a product is worthwhile, Mr. Watkins responded that the issuer would need to provide a cost benefit analysis that shows the return and guarantee. Mr. Tobe also offered a detailed example of how to diversify over 4 to 5 insurance companies to minimize the default risk and use synthetic stable value-like solutions for annuities to keep the fees low.   

   When asked if defined contribution plans should only use mutual funds due to their greater transparency, Mr. Tobe replied no and that he would rather see greater transparency requirements for collective investment trusts.

Annuities Exposed as Prohibited Transaction in 401(k) Plans

By Christopher B. Tobe, CFA, CAIA

Annuities should not be allowed in 401(k)s.   ERISA created the concept of Prohibited Transactions to prohibit any investments with clear Conflicts of Interest.  I testified to the ERISA Advisory Council – US Department of Labor in July of 2024 on the danger of allowing annuities to be hidden inside of Target Date Funds. [i]   I have co-written a paper with Economics Professor Tom Lambert on the excessive risks of annuities.[ii]

Perhaps with the exception of Crypto and Private Equity no investment better describes what should be a prohibited transaction more than annuity contracts.

Annuities are a Fiduciary Breach for 4 basic reasons.[iii]

  1. Single Entity Credit Risk
  2. Single Entity Liquidity Risk
  3. Hidden fees spread and expenses
  4. Structure -weak cherry-picked state regulated contracts, not securities and useless reserves

So why do we still see annuities in 401k plans?  The reason is intense lobbying by the insurance industry, that has blocked any transparency or oversight.

Annuity providers claim to be barely legal by relying on an Prohibited Transaction Exemption (PTE 84-4) a “get out of jail free card” obtained by $millions of lobbying by the insurance industry.


Biden Fiduciary Rule

The new Biden Fiduciary rule would provide transparency that would further expose these annuity products’ conflicts of interests.  The insurance industry has forue shopped in Texas in the Fifth Circuit for judges who agree with blocking transparency to block it for now.

At the Certified Financial Planner Board of Standards Connections Conference in Washington October 2024, DOL officials called out annuities as prohibited transactions. [iv]  Ali Khawar, principal deputy assistant secretary for the Employee Benefits Security Administration, laid out the reasons why the Biden Labor Department continues to fight for a fiduciary rule ““To me it continues to be kind of nonsensical that you’re expecting any of your clients to walk into someone’s office and have in their head: ‘I’m dealing with this person who’s going to sell insurance to me, this person is relying on [Prohibited Transaction Exemption] PTE 84-24, not [PTE] 2020-02. Those things shouldn’t mean anything to the average American. And we shouldn’t expect them to.”

broker-dealer space transformed what it means to be in the advice market,” Khawar said. “When we looked at the insurance market, though, we didn’t quite see the same thing.”

Under the National Association of Insurance Commissioners’ model rule, for example, “compensation is not considered a conflict of interest,” Khawar said.  “So there are pretty stark differences between what you see in the CFP standard, the Reg BI standard, and what has now been adopted by almost every state, one notable exception of New York, which has adopted a standard that is significantly tougher than the NAIC model rule.” [v]  That process is “the CFP standard, the DOL standard, it’s the SEC standard for investment advisors and it’s Reg BI,” Reish continued. What it’s not? “The NAIC model rule,” Reish said.

“The NAIC model rule does not require the comparative analysis[vi]

Khawar added: “It’s not going to matter whether you’re providing advice about an annuity, a variable annuity, fixed income annuity, indexed annuity, security or not.” The goal with the 2024 rule, Khawar added, is to “have a common standard across the retirement landscape so that all retirement investors would be able to make sure that when someone is marketing up front best-interest advice, that that’s the standard they’d be held to by the regulator and the customer.”

Under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, “being a fiduciary is critical to the central question of whether or not the law or consumer protections have fully kicked in or not,” Khawar added.

The Government Accounting Office wrote a piece in August in support of the Biden Fiduciary rule. They saw the problem as so severe that they suggested that IRS step in to help the DOL Better Oversee Conflicts of Interest Between Fiduciaries and Investors especially in the Insurance Annuity Area. [vii]  Senator Elizabeth Warren in defense of the Biden Fiduciary rule prepared a report on the numerous conflicts of interest in annuity commissions and kickbacks. [viii]

Annuities days of hiding behind PTE 84-4 are over

Prohibited transaction exemptions are subject to meeting certain requirements.  They include

  1. The Impartial Conduct Standards.
  2. Written Disclosures.
  3. Policies and Procedures
  4. Annual Retrospective Review and Report

The Impartial Conduct Standards have 4 major obligations. 

A. Care Obligation

B. Loyalty Obligation

C. Reasonable compensation limitation

D. No materially misleading statements (including by omission)

Care Obligation

This obligation reflects the care, skill, prudence, and diligence – similar to Prudent Person Fiduciary standard.   Diversification is one of the most basic fiduciary duties.  Fixed annuities flunk this with single entity credit and liquidity risk.  Diligence is nearly impossible with misleading nontransparent contracts, and the lack of plan/participant ownership of securities. The Federal Reserve in 1992 exposed the weak state regulatory and reserve claims.[ix]

Loyalty Obligation

Annuity contracts are designed to avoid all fiduciary obligation with no loyalty to participants.   Secret kickback and commissions place the financial interests of the Insurers and their affiliates over those of retirement investors.[x] 

The exemption requires the advisor to show their loyalty with a “Fiduciary Acknowledgement Disclosure.”   Annuity contracts avoid any fiduciary language or responsibility.

Reasonable compensation limitation

Annuities have a total lack of disclosure of profits, fees and compensation.  They have secret kickback commissions.

A number of lawsuits have settled with claims of excessive secret fees and spreads. An Insurance executive bragged at a conference of fees over 200 basis points (2%) in 2013. [xi]

No materially misleading statements (including by omission)

Annuities have numerous material misleading statements, including the total lack of disclosure of spread/fees.  They claim principal protection, but some fixed annuity contracts recently have broken the buck and violated their contracts.  The written disclosures under weak state regulations omit critical information on risks and fees.

Most plans with annuities do not have Investment policy statements, since most fixed annuities would flunk them on diversity and transparency and not be allowed.  Annuities cannot provide the transparency to follow CFA Institute Global Performance Standards (GIPS) so they do not comply.[xii]  Most 401(k) committees with insurance products do not review such annuity products, since they clueless on what they are.  Consultants for plans with annuities do not review the annuities most of the time since they are conflicted and they themselves receive kickbacks from annuity providers.

Annuities as a Prohibited Transaction

Annuities hide most of their compensation.   They are typically secret no bid contracts with no transparency and numerous conflicts of interest.  They are subject to weak state regulations (sometimes categorized as NAIC guidelines). Many times they are a party of interest and shift profits from annuities to make other fees appear smaller.

Annuities are clearly prohibited transactions, but have used their lobbying power in Washington and in states to exempt themselves from all accountability.


[i] https://commonsense401kproject.com/2024/07/31/chris-tobe-dol-testimony/

[ii] https://commonsense401kproject.com/2024/03/26/just-how-safe-are-safe-annuity-retirement-products-new-paper-shows-annuity-risks-are-too-high-for-any-fiduciary/

[iii] https://commonsense401kproject.com/2022/05/11/annuities-are-a-fiduciary-breach/

[iv] https://www.thinkadvisor.com/2024/10/07/top-dol-official-sees-a-nonsensical-reality-at-heart-of-fiduciary-fight/

[v] https://www.thinkadvisor.com/2024/10/07/top-dol-official-sees-a-nonsensical-reality-at-heart-of-fiduciary-fight/

[vi] https://www.thinkadvisor.com/2024/10/07/top-dol-official-sees-a-nonsensical-reality-at-heart-of-fiduciary-fight/

[vii] GAOJuly24  Retirement Investments: Agencies Can Better Oversee Conflicts of Interest Between Fiduciaries and Investors

[viii] Warren Study –  Annuity kickbacks

Secret kickback commissions https://consumerfed.org/annuity-industry-kickbacks-cost-retirement-savers-billions/

[ix] Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Summer 1992  Todd, Wallace  SPDA’s and GIC’s http://www.minneapolisfed.org/research/QR/QR1631.pdf

[x] https://consumerfed.org/annuity-industry-kickbacks-cost-retirement-savers-billions/

[xi] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-03-06/prudential-says-annuity-fees-would-make-bankers-dance?embedded-checkout=true

[xii] https://commonsense401kproject.com/2023/02/01/401k-plan-sponsors-should-look-to-cfa-code-for-investment-governance/