Why the “Meaningful Benchmark” Standard Is a Judicial Illusion Built for Wall Street

Over the last decade, a judicially fabricated standard has crept into ERISA litigation: the so-called “meaningful benchmark” requirement for claims alleging imprudence or excessive costs.

This appendix explains:

  1. Where the concept came from
  2. Why it is illegitimate as a substantive rule
  3. How it masks high-fee, high-risk products that cannot be meaningfully benchmarked

1. Origins: A Procedural Pleading Universe, Not an Investment Principle

The idea of a “meaningful benchmark” did not originate in investment theory, economics, or statutes. It was born out of ERISA procedural case law, largely as a 12(b)(6) pleading standard for plaintiffs alleging fiduciary breaches based on investment performance or fees.

The early case law adopted by some circuits required that, to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint alleging underperformance or excessive costs must include a comparator that is sufficiently similar — an “apples-to-apples” alternative that plausibly shows the fiduciary could have done better. Courts demanded such comparators because plaintiffs often had no discovery, and judges were (purportedly) reluctant to let cases proceed on uninformed guesses about what the fiduciary could have done differently.

But critically:

  • There is no statute that requires a “meaningful benchmark.”
  • ERISA’s prudence standard focuses on process, not performance relative to a counterfactual benchmark.
  • Benchmarks were a judicial convenience, not a substantive legal test.

2. It Is a Procedural Standard, Not a Substantive Investment Rule

The “meaningful benchmark” doctrine is a pleading rule — a device courts use to decide whether a complaint plausibly alleges imprudence before any discovery. It does not represent a real investment standard under ERISA or fiduciary law.

Indeed:

  • Some courts require it at the motion-to-dismiss stage.
  • Other circuits reject it as inappropriate fact-finding before discovery.

The Supreme Court now is considering this very issue in the Intel/Anderson cases — whether a meaningful benchmark is required at all at the pleading stage. The fact that this question has reached the Supreme Court underscores how unsettled and judge-crafted this standard really is.

In other words, meaningful benchmark is not a regulatory requirement; it is a judge’s attempt to police litigation before discovery by demanding early comparators. It is a procedural gatekeeper, not substantive law.


3. Why It Is Deceptive — Especially Against Insurance and Annuity Products

The meaningful benchmark standard sounds appealing — who wouldn’t want apples-to-apples comparisons? But in practice, it gives impermissibly broad cover to Wall Street, insurance companies, and institutional defenders because:

📌 a) Certain products cannot be benchmarked

· Fixed annuities
· General account insurance contracts
· Proprietary separate accounts
· Private equity and hedge funds

These products have no market-priced peers — you cannot find another open-end mutual fund that does what a fixed annuity does under discretionary crediting and balance-sheet mechanics.

Nothing in finance theory or asset pricing mandates that annuities must be compared to Vanguard, BlackRock, or S&P 500 products. Benchmarks are easier for public market instruments precisely because they have prices. Annuities do not. Thus, the meaningful benchmark standard is illogical when it comes to products that cannot be benchmarked.


4. The Standard Is Being Used to Hide, Not Reveal, Risk

The meaningful benchmark doctrine effectively says:

“If you cannot show an obvious benchmark that demonstrates harm, you have no case.”

That standard flips fiduciary law on its head.

Under ERISA, the duty of prudence is about process and risk-adjusted judgment — not about whether some benchmark existed on which the fiduciary could have hypothetically outperformed. Instead, defendants have latched on to this judicial invention to argue that a lack of benchmark equals lack of harm — a position that serves Wall Street and insurance producers very well.


5. The Investment Industry Loves It — Because It Lets Them Sneak In Opaque, High-Fee Products

Investment intermediaries and insurers have a strategic advantage when the standard is “meaningful benchmark.”

Why?

Because the industry sells products that do not have logical benchmarks:

  • Annuities
  • Indexed insurance contracts
  • Private market funds
  • Multi-asset strategies with proprietary glidepaths

These products cannot be meaningfully compared to:

  • Public index funds
  • Mutual funds
  • Standard benchmarks

So the industry says:

“There is no market benchmark — therefore the allegation fails.”

This argument presumes the answer, rather than evaluating whether the fiduciary followed a prudent process or whether the product’s risks and costs were adequately disclosed and managed.


6. The Standard Was Never Explained in Investment Texts or Statutes

You won’t find “meaningful benchmark” defined in:

  • ERISA itself
  • DOL regulations
  • Investment management texts
  • SEC rules

It is purely a judicial procedural rule, created in cases like Ruilova, Barrick Gold, Oshkosh, and others that required comparators in pleadings. But there is no canonical source where the concept was explained and justified in investment academic literature. It is a creature of litigation economics, not fiduciary economics.

Now the Supreme Court is being asked to decide whether that procedural invention should even survive constitutional and statutory scrutiny.


7. The Standard Shields Wall Street at the Cost of Participants

Here’s the real impact:

👉 Judges who require a “meaningful benchmark” are effectively saying to plaintiffs:

“If you can’t find a near-identical investment strategy with public pricing, you have no case.”

This approach:

  • Promotes a hindsight performance regime
  • Undermines process-based prudence
  • Shields producers of opaque, illiquid, proprietary products
  • Raises barriers to scrutiny even where conflicts and undisclosed compensation are obvious

That is the opposite of ERISA’s purpose.

ERISA is supposed to protect participants from conflicts of interest, hidden costs, and imprudent choices, not protect Wall Street by enforcing a “benchmark inoculation” against scrutiny.


8. Because Judges Lack Investment Economics Training, They Default to Benchmarks

One reason the meaningful benchmark standard took hold is that many judges:

  • Lack finance or investment economics training
  • Are uncomfortable evaluating risk and compensation structures that do not fit classic mutual fund models
  • Are influenced by industry amici and defense briefings that frame benchmarks as the only way to demonstrate imprudence

The result:

A “benchmark requirement” becomes a judicial shortcut — not because it is technically correct, but because it makes litigation easier for courts that do not want to engage with real economics.

This dynamic benefits Wall Street, not participants.


9. As We Explained Earlier in Commonsense, Benchmarks Don’t Work for Complex Solutions

Our earlier discussion of target-date benchmarks — including why simple index comparisons are inadequate and how product design matters more than benchmarking — already exposed this fallacy. Benchmarks assume liquidity, transparency, and comparability — all of which are absent in the annuity, separate account, and private market contexts at issue in Intel, Cho, and other cases.


10. Bottom Line — “Meaningful Benchmark” Is a Procedural Illusion

The “meaningful benchmark” standard is not a substantive fiduciary rule; it is:

  • A judicial pleading device
  • A procedural barrier
  • A way for judges uncomfortable with investment economics to avoid deep analysis
  • A shield for the industry to hide products that cannot be bench-marked

And it should not be used to legitimize high-fee, high-risk contracts in ERISA plans — especially when:

  • The products are opaque;
  • Compensation is hidden;
  • Benchmarks don’t exist; and
  • Participants rely on fiduciaries, not benchmarks, for informed decisions.

https://commonsense401kproject.com/2026/01/17/the-supreme-courts-intel-case-is-about-secrecy-fake-benchmarks-and-fiduciary-illusions/ https://commonsense401kproject.com/2025/07/09/target-date-benchmarks-chatgpt/

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